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What is the role of entrepreneurship in economic development? At a minimum the answer 
should be able to explain the role of entrepreneurs in the structural transformation of countries 
from low income, primary-sector based societies into high-income service and technology 
based societies. More broadly though, it should also be able to explain the role of 
entrepreneurs in the opposite pole of stagnating development (including conflict) and in high 
innovation-driven growth. Although economic development lacks a ‘general theory’ of 
entrepreneurship, which could encompass a variety of development experiences, much 
progress has been made in extending the understanding of entrepreneurship in the process of 
development. This paper surveys the progress with the purpose of distilling the outlines for a 
more general theory of entrepreneurship in economic development. Entrepreneurship in 
developing countries remains a relatively under-researched phenomenon, so by surveying the 
current state of research, and by discussing the role of entrepreneurship in dual economy 
models of structural transformation and growth, a secondary objective of this paper is to 
identify avenues for further research. Finally, the policy implications from the economic 
literature suggest that a case for government support exists, and that this should focus on the 
quantity, the quality, and the allocation of entrepreneurial ability. Many routinely adopted 
policies for entrepreneurship, such as provision of credit and education, are shown to have 
more subtle effects, not all of which are conducive to growth-enhancing entrepreneurship. 
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1 Introduction 
What is the role of entrepreneurship in economic development? At a minimum, the 
answer should be able to explain the role of entrepreneurs in the structural 
transformation of countries from low income, primary-sector based societies into high-
income service and technology based societies. More broadly though, it should also be 
able to explain the role of entrepreneurs in the opposite poles of stagnating development 
(including war/conflict) and in accelerating growth (including high innovation) 
situations. Over the past fifty years or so the world has experienced a wide diversity of 
development experiences, from successful economic structural transformations (such as 
in East Asia), mixed-success transformations (as in many countries of the former Soviet 
Union), rapid innovation episodes—sometimes accompanied by high growth (such as in 
Finland, India, Ireland, and the US to an extent), but also growth stagnation, collapse 
and persistent conflict (as in many African countries). Although economic development 
theory can still be argued to lack a ‘general theory’ of entrepreneurship, one that could 
encompass a variety of development outcomes, progress has been made in extending the 
notion and understanding of entrepreneurship in economic development. This paper 
surveys the progress from the perspective of the variety of economic development 
experiences, with the purpose of distilling the outlines for a more general theory of 
entrepreneurship in economic development. Despite the progress, entrepreneurship in 
economic development remains a relatively under-researched phenomenon.1 Lingelbach 
et al. (2005:1) recently pointed out ‘Entrepreneurship in developing countries is 
arguably the least studied significant economic and social phenomenon in the world 
today’. By surveying the current state of research, a secondary objective of this paper is 
to identify avenues for further research. 
Over recent years policy makers have shown increasing interest in the role of 
entrepreneurship to generate economic growth and development. On one hand this has 
been stimulated by the rapid growth of the private sector in economies such as Brazil, 
China, India, and South Africa (described as ‘southern engines of growth’)2 and on the 
other by realisation of the need for private sector strength in many fragile and failed 
states, such as Somalia, DR Congo, and others (Naudé 2007). Understanding 
development—or the lack thereof—and identifying suitable policies to foster 
development may require that the dynamics of entrepreneurship in these environments 
be better understood. It is however not only to developing countries that the growing 
interest in entrepreneurship as a catalyst for growth has been seen. In the US calls have 
been made for more support to entrepreneurs, which is seen as indispensable for the US 
                                                 
1   Shane (1997:86) reviewing 472 entrepreneurship papers published in 19 different international 
journals found that amongst the 13 most frequently published authors, all resided in advanced 
economies and their work dealt with advanced economy. In another extensive survey of the 
mainstream entrepreneurship literature Van Praag and Versloot (2007:3) confine their survey to the 
literature dealing with advanced economies, stating that the contribution of entrepreneurs to economic 
value-added is likely to differ in developing countries. If, how, and why this contribution differs 
remains a relatively unexplored research topic, which we hereby attempt to contribute to. 
2   In China the growth in entrepreneurship, as measured by self-employment, was ‘explosive’, not only 
in the richer coastal provinces, but also in rural areas, where the number of self-employed increased 
by more than 30 million between 1988 and 1995 (Mohapatra et al. 2007:163).   2
to regain a competitive lead in the world economy (see e.g. Schramm 2004; Baumol 
et al. 2007). In the EU, the Lisbon Declaration of March 2000 is explicit in identifying 
entrepreneurship as the key to the EU becoming the most competitive world region by 
2010. Reviewing the linkages between entrepreneurship and economic development 
may thereof also be of interest to researchers and policy makers in advanced economies. 
In developing countries the concern is with (entrepreneurship) starting and accelerating 
growth, and in providing impetus to the structural transformation of economies; in the 
advanced economies the concern is largely with obtaining new sources of productivity 
growth (which underlies competitiveness). 
Given these practical concerns, an understanding of entrepreneurship in diverse contexts 
becomes important in order to know if and how entrepreneurs matter for economic 
growth and development, and if and how entrepreneurial capacity can be extended so as 
to further the economic dimensions of development.  
This paper will proceed as follows. In section 2 the concept and definition of 
entrepreneurship is discussed. Section 3 describes the process of entrepreneurship, and 
the various theoretical and empirical contributions in the literature to the understanding 
of this process. In section 4, the implications of the process of entrepreneurship for 
economic development are drawn out. Section 5 discusses the policy implications. 
Section 6 concludes by summarizing and offering a few suggestions for further 
research. 
2  The concept and definition of entrepreneurship 
It is almost customary to start a paper on entrepreneurship by delineating the concept 
and discussing the way in which it can be measured. This is because of the number of 
different ways in which entrepreneurship can be approached: Wennekers and Thurik 
(1999:30) identify thirteen distinct roles of an entrepreneur.3 One reason for the 
multiplicity of definitions/roles is due to the fact that entrepreneurship is studied ‘in 
virtually all disciplines ranging from social anthropology to organizational theory to 
mathematical economics’ (Henrekson 2007:717). Nevertheless, within economics the 
entrepreneur is most often approached from an occupational definition, a behavioral 
definition, or an outcomes definition. 
The occupational definition sees entrepreneurs as the self-employed; based on the 
notion that a person can either be unemployed, self-employed, or in wage employment. 
It is measured either statically (through the number of self-employed)4 or dynamically 
(through the rate of start-ups) (Wennekers and Thurik 1999). In the economic 
                                                 
3   According to Coyne and Leeson (2004:235) the diversity in approaches towards the nature of the 
entrepreneur has complicated the formal modelling of the entrepreneur in economics.   
4   The rate of self-employment differs significantly across countries. According to a sample based on 
2001 data put together by Robson (2007:867) the highest rates of self-employment were in developing 
countries such as Sri Lanka (44.8 per cent), Indonesia (44.7 per cent), and Madagascar (43.7 per cent). 
In contrast, in developed countries the rate is much lower, for instance 6.8 per cent in Norway, 8.8 per 
cent in Denmark, and 8.9 per cent in France.   3
development literature this definition of entrepreneurship is perhaps encountered most 
often, due to many formally-registered unemployed who seek to eke out a living 
through informal self-employment in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2007). Because many of these entrepreneurs are not in self-
employment by choice but by necessity,5 a distinction if often made in the measurement 
of entrepreneurship between necessity entrepreneurs, and opportunity entrepreneurs. 
The former is self-employed because of the lack of wage employment, while the latter is 
self-employed by choice, in order to exploit some perceived ‘opportunity’ (see the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, GEM)6—or to overcome regulations or avoid taxes. 
This has been described as ‘evasive’ entrepreneurship (Henrekson 2007; Coyne and 
Leeson 2004). As a result the GEM has attempted to measure within the scope of 
‘opportunity’ entrepreneurship what they term ‘high potential’ total entrepreneurial 
activity (TEA)7 (Wong et al. 2005:341). 
From a behavioural point of view, a number of definitions have described the 
entrepreneur according to perceived functions that are performed. Schumpeter’s (1950; 
1961) well-known view is of the entrepreneur as the coordinator of production and 
agent of change (‘creative destruction’). As such the entrepreneur is an innovator. 
Kirzner (1973) described the entrepreneur not primarily as someone who initiates 
change, but who facilitates adjustment to change by spotting opportunities for profitable 
arbitrage. Knight (1921) emphasized the uncertainty attached to the exploitation of 
opportunities. According to Schultz (1975:843) the entrepreneur is anyone who can 
‘perceive an economic disequilibrium, evaluate its attributes ... and if it is found to be 
worthwhile to act, reallocate their resources’. Kanbur (1979:773) has the notion of the 
entrepreneur as one who ‘manages the production function’ by paying workers wages 
(which are more certain than profits) and shouldering the risks and uncertainties of 
production (see also Newman 2007:1). The way in which entrepreneurs discharge these 
functions would often, although not exclusively, be through the creation of a new firm, 
as defined by Hart (2003:5) who sees entrepreneurship essentially as the ‘process of 
starting and continuing to expand new businesses’. Most new firms are small firms, so 
that a substantial part of the entrepreneurship literature is concerned with the dynamics 
of SMEs.8 
It is implied, especially from Schultz’s (1975) definition of entrepreneurship, that 
entrepreneurship need not result in creation of new firms. According to Hitt et al. (2001) 
entrepreneurship can be seen as part of the management function within existing firms. 
                                                 
5   As pointed out by Glaeser (2007:1) the self-employment rate ‘makes little distinction between 
Michael Bloomberg and a hot dog vendor outside of city hall’. 
6   The GEM research program is an annual assessment of the national level of entrepreneurial activity. 
See http://www.gemconsortium.org/about.asp  
7   GEM defines high potential TEA as a start-up that meets at least four requirements namely:   
(a) it plans to employ at least 20 workers within five years, (b) it has a positive market creation effect, 
(c) at least 25 per cent of its customers are abroad, and (d) it employs technology that were not 
available a year previously (Wong et al. 2005:345).  
8   Indeed many policy-makers see small business promotion as synonymous with entrepreneurial 
support. Although small firms no doubt can be entrepreneurial, and may have advantages in the 
modern global economy (Audretsch and Thurik 2004), they are not necessarily, synonymous with 
entrepreneurship or entrepreneurial ventures (Wennekers and Thurik 1999:29).   4
In recent years the behavioural notion of entrepreneurship has been broadened to 
include the concepts of corporate entrepreneurship/strategic entrepreneurship and 
‘intrapreneurship’, which has been defined as the ‘pursuit of creative or new solutions to 
challenges confronting the firm’ (Antoncic and Hisrich 2001:495) and various notions 
of non-market entrepreneurship (see the discussion in Acs and Kallas 2007:28-35). In 
this paper the focus will be on the role of entrepreneurs in creating new firms.9 
Entrepreneurship can also be defined from the outcomes that different types of 
entrepreneurship can have on the economy. These definitions are based on the 
realisation that not all forms of entrepreneurship are good for economic development. 
Using data from 37 countries surveyed by the GEM in 2002 Wong et al. (2005:345) find 
that only high-potential entrepreneurial activity is positively associated with economic 
growth in their sample. 
According to Baumol (1990:895) entrepreneurship can be productive, unproductive 
(e.g. rent-seeking), or even destructive (e.g. illegal activities). He defines entrepreneurs 
as ‘persons who are ingenious and creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, 
power, and prestige’ (1990:987). Henrekson (2007:719) in a similar vein proposes that 
‘entrepreneurship can be seen as a continual quest for economic rents, i.e. rates of return 
exceeding the risk-adjusted market return’. He describes (2007:729) the sources of 
‘Ricardian’ rents (and their short term equivalents of ‘Marshallian’ rents) such as access 
to natural resources, patents, and tacit knowledge, and points out that these rents can be 
obtained through many different means: from innovative activities to bribes. According 
to Coyne and Leeson (2004:236) this may imply that underdevelopment is not due to an 
insufficient supply of entrepreneurs, but due to a ‘lack of profit opportunities tied to 
activities that yield economic growth’. 
In this paper I will be referring back to these various definitions of the entrepreneur in 
first describing the process of entrepreneurship as seen through economic lenses 
(section 3) and then setting out what is known about the links between entrepreneurship 
and economic development (section 4). Section 5 contains policy implications. 
3  The process of entrepreneurship 
The process of entrepreneurship can be described as going through at least four 
phases,10 the conception (when the would-be entrepreneur perceives an opportunity), 
the gestation phase (when the opportunity is evaluated), the infancy phase (when the 
firm is created), and the adolescence phase (where after the firm matures) (Reynolds 
1993:14). In addition, the phase of firm closure (exit) has also been the subject of 
                                                 
9   There is a related literature that asks the question, which factors influence the organizational form of 
the firm that is created. In this paper I am generally concerned, as is the bulk of the economics 
literature on this subject, with profit-maximizing firms. There are however, many ‘entrepreneurs’ that 
start as not-for-profit (NFP) firms. According to Parker (2007:698) these NFP-firms exist and survive 
because of legal limitations on the distribution of any profits to the owners, which raises confidence of 
investors in the entrepreneurs’ motivations. 
10    These phases correspond approximately to Shane and Venkataraman’s (2000) description of 
entrepreneurship as consisting of the identification, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities.   5
scrutiny, given the high rates of observed firm closures and inter-generational (family) 
firm changes. Each of these phases has generated its own theoretical and empirical 
insights. These will be discussed briefly, with implications for firm creation and growth 
in developing countries noted. 
3.1  Conception and gestation 
In what follows, the notion of entrepreneurial ability will stand out as a central 
determinant of the rate of start-ups and their success. Key entrepreneurial abilities are 
the alertness to perceive and act on opportunities (Licht 2007; Gaglio and Katz 2001) 
and the ability to function under uncertainty and risk (Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979). 
Much attention has been paid to these abilities in the psychology and management 
literatures. One pertinent finding is that persons who start their own firm are often 
overly-optimistic, suggesting that many become entrepreneurs despite a potential lack 
of objectively sound opportunities, or of being able to identify those opportunities 
correctly (Arabsheibani et al. 2000). 
The conception phase of entrepreneurship is inhabited by latent entrepreneurs. These are 
persons who would prefer to be self-employed and who are considering seeking or are 
actively seeking the opportunity(Blanchflower et al. 2001:680).11 In the OECD, about 
25 per cent of the labour force has been found to be latent entrepreneurs (ibid.). 
Various definitions of opportunities exist, for instance Shane and Venkataraman (2000) 
define an ‘opportunity’ as when goods can be sold at a profit. Following the definitions 
of entrepreneurs by Baumol (1990) and Henrekson (2007) as discussed in section 2, an 
opportunity need not only arise in the context of the creation of a firm or in the market 
place, but can entail any opportunity for an individual to advance his/her ‘wealth, power 
or status’. McMullen et al. (2007:3) refer to the view that ‘the subjective or socially 
constructed nature of opportunity makes it impossible to separate opportunity from the 
individual’. In what follows I will however argue that in order to make sense of the role 
of entrepreneurship in economic development, one has to allow for the existence of 
objectively independent opportunities to exist—and for differing abilities to perceive 
these opportunities, as well as for differences in abilities to assess and manage the 
various risk and uncertainty profiles attached to each opportunity. Thus, in certain 
contexts there will be different opportunities available to entrepreneurs, and not all of 
these opportunities are ‘tied to activities that yield economic growth’ (Coyne and 
Leeson 2004:236). 
The psychological (individual-level) aspect that influences this ability has not been 
adequately researched in the context of developing countries. Two issues in particular 
have however been noted. The first is the apparent lack of interest by many poor people 
to seek opportunities. In a recent review of the behaviour of the extreme poor (those 
living on less than US$1 per day) Banerjee and Duflo (2007:165) are perplexed by the 
apparent lack of the poor to perceive opportunities, stating ‘one senses a reluctance of 
poor people to commit themselves psychologically to a project of making more money’. 
This may, however, not only reflect a lack of psychological commitment, but also that 
                                                 
11   Once they are actively trying to start up a business, they are described as ‘nascent’ entrepreneurs 
(Robson 2007:865).   6
entrepreneurs have limited attention, and that in poor countries the environment is such 
that it attaches a very high cost for an individual to turn attention away from pressing 
matters in order to seek or perceive new opportunities—which may be scarce12 (Gifford 
1998:17). The second is that for households at subsistence level, assuming the high risk 
of trying to exploit opportunities which are subject to uncertainty may be unacceptable 
as the potential losses may outweigh the potential gains. Thus manager-owners, family 
businesses, and household enterprises often experience difficulty in innovating and 
adopting new technology. 
3.2  Start-up and infancy 
Economic theory has approached the decision of an individual to start-up a firm as an 
occupational choice between self-employment and wage-employment, following 
important contributions by amongst others Lucas (1978), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), 
and Murphy et al. (1991). The factors that affect this occupational choice depend 
broadly on an individual’s entrepreneurial ability, the relative rates of return to 
entrepreneurship, as well as obstacles such as capital constraints and entry (start-up) 
costs, and factors that influence the opportunity costs of becoming self-employed. 
3.2.1 Entrepreneurial ability 
Entrepreneurial ability is a core element of occupational choice models (e.g. Lucas 
1978;13 Evans and Jovanovic 1989). As recognized by Kanniainen and Poutvaara 
(2007:676) ‘people differ substantially in terms of their ability to produce a business 
idea, elaborate their idea, and make its way to a marketable product or service’. 
Entrepreneurial ability or characteristics have been the object of much study, with the 
focus on the risk-taking behaviour of entrepreneurs, their perception of opportunities (or 
‘disequilibrium’),14 their need for achievement, their internal locus of control, and 
motivational goals (Licht 2007:818). Baptista et al. (2007) consider entrepreneurial 
ability to consist of human capital, social capital, and cognition. In Kihlstrom and 
Laffont (1979) entrepreneurial ability includes being less risk-averse and open to 
uncertainty. In the management literature the focus has been on the ‘entrepreneurial 
ability’ of firms, with various measures having been proposed in order to measure how 
‘entrepreneurial’ firms are. Mezzour and Autio (2007), for instance, discuss the 
concepts of ‘entrepreneurial orientation’ and ‘entrepreneurial management’ according to 
which the entrepreneurial ability of a firm can be captured by its opportunity 
orientation, resource orientation, management flexibility, reward philosophy, growth 
ambitions, and entrepreneurial culture. 
Åstebro and Bernhardt (2005) denote the concept of entrepreneurial ability by θ and see 
it is an important determinant of start-up rates. It has also been treated as an important 
determinant of firm survival (Cagetti and De Nardi 2005a; 2005b). Cagetti and De 
                                                 
12  As recently put by Majola (2008:1) ‘the million dollar question is: How do you make money when 
people around you live in poverty? How do you make money when there is no money?’. 
13  Lucas (1978:511) uses the term ‘manager’, but equates it with ‘entrepreneur’. 
14  Schultz (1975:834) sees entrepreneurial ability as the ability to perceive disequilibrium in markets and 
to reallocate resources to take advantage thereof.    7
Nardi (ibid.) and Fonseca et al. (2007:648) make a distinction between entrepreneurial 
ability (θ) and working ability (ε). The former they define as the capacity to ‘invest 
capital productivity’, and the latter as the capacity to ‘produce income out of labour’. 
Thus an individual with high entrepreneurial ability might have even higher working 
ability, and will be less likely to enter into entrepreneurship (Fonseca et al. 2007:655). 
3.2.2 Returns  to  entrepreneurship 
With entrepreneurs essentially ‘rent’ seekers, the expected returns to being self-
employed need to be weighed against the alternatives. These include wages from 
employment and social security (e.g. unemployment insurance and pension benefits). In 
simple terms, the occupational choice can be explained by explicitly incorporating 
entrepreneurial ability (θ) into the production function, as in Murphy et al. (1991: 
508-9): 
L w L F A Q . ) ( . . − = θ  (1) 
Where Q is output, A is a commonly available technology, F(L) the relation between 
output and labour inputs, and w is the wage rate. Because each person has an 
entrepreneurial ability (some better than others), it can be shown, generalizing from 
Murphy et al. (1991:509) that a person will become an entrepreneur if profits and the 
non-pecuniary benefits from self-employment exceed wage income plus additional 
benefits from being in wage employment. 
μ η θ + > + − ) ( . )) ( . )) ( ( . . ( A L w A L w A L F A  (2) 
Where  η denote the non-pecuniary benefits of entrepreneurship (following 
Blanchflower and Oswald 1998:30) and μ other diverse benefits from wage 
employment. Barriers such as start-up costs and capital requirements will influence 
whether an entrepreneur can proceed given (2). In sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 I discuss 
these barriers. One can also note that other regulatory aspects, such as taxes, can be 
included in (2). Gentry and Hubbard (2000:284) introduce taxes on profits (τs) and taxes 
on wages (τw) to show that relative tax rates may influence the start-up decision. 
However, empirical studies tend to find ambiguous results: some finding increases in 
taxation to raise the rate of self-employment and some the reverse (Henrekson 
2007:733; Schuetze and Bruce 2004). 
Because entrepreneurial ability determines the marginal production from capital and 
labour (as in equation 1) the size of the firm (proxied by the size L) will be determined 
by the extent to which the ability of the entrepreneur can be ‘stretched’ across greater 
number of employees (Fonseca et al. 2007:649). This is consistent with empirical 
evidence which finds that if entrepreneurial ability is (imperfectly) proxied by 
educational level and/or age, that the size of the firm the individual operates will be 
larger. Also the probability that the entrepreneur chooses to operate his or her firm in 
the formal (as opposed to the informal) sector of the economy will be higher (De Paula 
and Scheinkman 2007). 
Equation (2) represents the key determinants of entrepreneurial start-ups. On the left 
hand side entrepreneurial ability (θ) has already been discussed. The left hand side of 
(2) also includes A, which is often assumed to be commonly available. However, this   8
may not be the case: imitation may be costly and A.F(L) may be subject to uncertainty. 
Dixit (1989) has shown that with high uncertainty, as is the case in many developing 
countries, and if there are sunk costs in establishing a firm, then there will exist an 
option value for an entrepreneur to wait before entry. This would depress entry rates. 
Also, uncertainty may reduce the size of a firm (see section 3.2.1). 
On the right hand side of (2) we have wages. Higher relative expected wages can be 
expected to lower the probability of an individual opting for self-employment. The 
expected wage is inversely related to the unemployment rate. Thus with higher 
unemployment is has been found that self-employment rise (Rissman 2003). Empirical 
research have noted a ‘paradox’ in that individuals often appear make the occupational 
choice in favour of self-employment when the monetary returns are less than they 
would have obtained if they had remained in or chosen wage employment (Hamilton 
2000). Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) offer a number of explanations, 
namely that these individuals have a high tolerance for risk, that they may misperceive 
risk, and are overly optimistic (see also Arabsheibani et al. 2000), or that there are large 
non-pecuniary benefits (η in equation 2) to being an entrepreneur.15 Shorrocks 
(1988:241) proposed a model in which individuals are willing to earn less returns in 
entrepreneurship than they would have received in wage employment because being in 
self-employment allows them to gain experience and improve their entrepreneurial 
ability with a view to being able to eventually ‘search for large prizes’. 
Most of the subsequent literature in economics has tended however to focus on non-
pecuniary benefits. For entrepreneurship these may include a preference for 
independency (autonomy) and a preference for variety (Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen 2002:747; Licht 2007:825). Evidence for non-pecuniary benefits is presented 
by Taylor (1996), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), and Blanchflower (2004), who 
show that the self-employed (entrepreneurs) at least in OECD countries have 
consistently higher rates of job satisfaction than wage-labourers. Bosma et al. (2005:40) 
point out that the value of non-pecuniary benefits will be larger in a society that has a 
good entrepreneurial ‘culture’. This is a culture that can place a high value on 
independence, which allows for less conformity, is more tolerant towards inequalities in 
income and wealth, and where little or no stigma is attached to firm failure (Licht 
2007:850). Giannetti and Simonov (2004:269) find evidence from Sweden that culture 
and social norms might create these non-pecuniary benefits: in their sample the 
likelihood of a person being an entrepreneur is higher where there are other 
entrepreneurs, even if the relative returns to entrepreneurship is lower. 
Education has a theoretically ambiguous effect on start-ups, as it can influence both θ 
and w. Empirical studies confirm this ambiguity (Giannetti and Simonov 2004:273). It 
can reduce the probability of self-employment, and raise the probability of firm exit (see 
below) as it raises the wage rate that an individual can earn in formal employment. 
However, it can also impart skills needed to be an entrepreneur and improve 
entrepreneurial ability. In the latter regard Burke et al. (2000) and Lazear (2005) have 
found that the type of education may matter, arguing respectively that practical skills 
and a general/broad-based education (being ‘jack-of-all-trades’) is better for 
                                                 
15  In Polvoknichenko (2003) it is shown that non-pecuniary gains need not be substantial to encourage 
entry into entrepreneurship.   9
entrepreneurs rather than academic qualifications or a narrow specialization. Nafziger 
and Terrell (1996) argue that broader, practical skills, often the kind obtained through 
experience, may be important. They find from a study of Indian entrepreneurs that age, 
experience, and background can compensate for lack of education in start-up rates and 
the success of the firm. Baptista et al. (2007) find similar evidence from a longitudinal 
study of Portuguese firms. Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2000:141) find that in Côte 
D’Ivoire, formal education improves the ‘learning capabilities of individuals’ which 
improves their entrepreneurial ability.  
Stam et al. (2007b:7) argues that the educational status of a person will have a positive 
effect on the entrepreneurial start-up rate, because the more highly educated will be able 
to more easily find employment if the start-up is unsuccessful. The potential positive 
role of education on start-ups through entrepreneurial ability is consistent with the 
theoretical and empirical suggestions that the likelihood of someone starting a new firm 
has an inverse U-shaped relationship with age: thus as a person gains more experience, 
his or her human capital and entrepreneurial ability improves. However, after a period, 
with higher age, learning becomes more difficult and entrepreneurial ability might 
decline again (Bönte et al. 2007) 
Similar to the ambiguous influence of better education on the probability of becoming 
an entrepreneur, the literature has identified both positive and negative impacts of 
improved social security measures (included in μ in equation 2) on entrepreneurship. On 
the one hand, social security can be expected to lower the risk involved in starting a new 
business, and thus raise the rate of entrepreneurship from amongst risk-averse 
individuals. However, by raising the opportunity costs, it may lower the rate of 
entrepreneurship. Empirical evidence tends to favour the latter explanation. For instance 
Fonseca et al. (2007) find that the proportion of entrepreneurs in the age group 50 to 80 
years differ significantly across EU countries and that it is much higher in countries 
with more limited pension benefits. Thus in France, where pension benefits are good, 
the rate of self-employment in this age group is 5.2 per cent, while for Italy where 
pension benefits are less good, it is 11.7 per cent (Fonseca et al. 2007:641). 
Finally the returns from being self-employed may depend on the way in which the 
entrepreneur enters the market, either through creation of new firm or by purchasing an 
existing firm. The latter option may be more profitable, if failures in the market for 
second-hand firms can be overcome. As in the case of second-hand vehicles (see 
Akerlof’s 1970 classic contribution) these market failures are largely due to information 
mismatches. Kanniainen and Poutvaara (2007:685-6) identify three such informational 
mismatches: (a) matching entrepreneurs who wish to sell their firms with potential 
buyers, (b) evaluating the tacit knowledge in an existing firm and how to transmit this to 
the potential new owner, and (c) entrepreneurs who want to sell their firm may attach 
emotional value to their firm causing them to either overprice or under-price the firm. 
The implication is that if these informational failures can be overcome, the rate of entry 
into entrepreneurship, through purchasing existing firms, will be higher. 
3.2.3  Start-up costs and regulations 
Start-up costs and regulations refer to the effort required to begin a firm. It differs in 
duration and content from country to country, but generally include aspects such as the 
cost, number of procedures and time it takes to obtain a permit to operate a business,    10
the costs of setting up a business, which often includes a fixed cost/sunk cost element, 
and the regulations that needs to be adhered to in terms of labour and production and 
organisation standards (Fonseca et al. 2001). The motivation for positive entry costs and 
regulation are to protect the public and workers from potential fraud and exploitation by 
unscrupulous agents (Fonseca et al. 2007), to ‘weed out’ low quality entrepreneurs 
(Parker 2007:703), and to improve tax collection on firm income (Klapper et al. 
2006:593). Djankov et al. (2002) found evidence that higher entry costs and more 
regulation are associated with higher levels of corruption, suggesting that entry costs 
and regulations may also be imposed by rent-seeking officials—with the implication 
that entry costs and regulation may not keep out unscrupulous agents in countries with 
high levels of corruption (Klapper et al. 2006:622). Parker (2007:707) speculates that 
incumbent entrepreneurs may drive an increase in the regulation of business entry that 
has been observed in many countries, as a way of creating barriers to entry for new 
firms. Djankov et al. (2002) found that in countries with high entry costs and regulations 
the size of the informal economy (unregulated self-employment) is higher, indicating 
the existence of ‘evasive’ entrepreneurship. 
Empirical evidence (coming from developed countries) concurs that entry costs and 
regulations—especially labour market regulations—tend to lower the start-up rate of 
new firms (e.g. Fonseca et al. 2001; Desai et al. 2003; Klapper et al. 2006).16 Klapper 
et  al. (ibid.), using data from a sample of EU countries, finds that entry costs and 
regulations tend to keep out smaller firms, and contributes to lower productivity from 
incumbent firms through lowering rates of competition from new firms. The fact that 
the gap between latent and actual entrepreneurship varies across countries is seen as 
being attributable to differences in entry costs and regulations, and access to start-up 
capital, between these countries (see e.g. Blanchflower et al. 2001). 
Fonseca et al. (2001) finds evidence from OECD countries that start-up costs hinder 
entrepreneurial entry and result in lower employment. They set out a theoretical model 
to explain this. In this model, entrepreneurial ability (θ) is equated with the number of 
jobs that an entrepreneur can create. If each job that the entrepreneur creates generates a 
surplus of P, then the total expected profits for an entrepreneur of ability θ is θP. 
Individuals must make an occupational choice between being an entrepreneur (which 
earns  θP) or being in wage-employment (which earns W). However, to become an 
entrepreneur requires start-up costs of K. Given these choices, Fonseca et al. (2001:696) 
show that an individual will become an entrepreneur only if θP – K ≥ W. This implies 
that θ ≥ (W + K) / P, which can be interpreted as a ‘reservation’ entrepreneurial ability 
(θR) below which an individual will prefer wage employment. To model the impact of 
start-up costs on employment, they introduce the features of a search equilibrium model, 
so that not all jobs (P) are filled by workers (there are vacancies, denoted by V) and that 
not all workers can find a job (there is unemployment, denoted by U). Labour market 
‘tightness’ can be measured by the number of vacancies per unemployed person (ω),  
i.e.  ω = V / U (2001:695). The relationship between ω and θR will determine the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment and the number of entrepreneurs. This can be 
depicted with the help of Figure 1, adapted from Fonseca et al. (2001:697). 
                                                 
16  Van Stel et al. (2007) finds empirical evidence from a sample of 39 developed countries that capital 
costs and labour regulations matter for start-ups, but not the time, costs, or number of procedures 
needed to start a firm.   11
Figure 1: The impact of start-up costs on the rate of entrepreneurship and unemployment
 
Source: Fonseca et al. (2001:697) 
In Figure 1 the upward sloping E-curve denotes a rate of entrepreneurship consistent 
with various combinations of labour market tightness and entrepreneurial reservation 
ability. It is upward sloping because as ω increases (relative more vacancies), the 
threshold entrepreneurial ability required will increase (as more jobs need to be 
created). The downward sloping J-curve denoted the rate of job creation consistent with 
various combinations of labour market tightness and entrepreneurial reservation ability. 
This indicates that as the required reservation level of entrepreneurial ability increases, 
unemployment will increase so that there will be fewer vacancies per unemployed. The 
equilibrium entrepreneurial ability rate is shown as θR1 in the figure. Fonseca et al. 
(2001:699) show that the introduction of start-up costs (K) will shift the E-curve 
outwards, so that there is now less vacancies per unemployed. Unemployment is higher 
because there are less individuals in entrepreneurship (where there is no unemployment) 
and fewer workers find a job. Thus start-up costs results in both fewer entrepreneurs and 
higher unemployment. 
The Fonseca et al. (2001) model and empirical results pertain to a developed country 
setting where there is less evasive or unproductive entrepreneurship. Often, labour 
market regulations, including union behaviour that for instance make dismissal of 
workers more difficult and raise minimum wages (e.g. W in the above model), have 
been argued to stimulate self-employment, as evasive entrepreneurship—but to reduce 
productive entrepreneurship by raising opportunity costs of entrepreneurship as well as 
the fixed/sunk costs to entry (Kanniainen and Poutvaara 2007:676; Henrekson 2007: 
737). They have also been argued to be particularly detrimental to small firms, where 
such regulations may limit the effective allocation of labour. This is because unlike in 
larger firms, smaller firms cannot easily match workers with heterogeneous abilities to 
tasks best suited to them within the firm (Henrekson 2007:737). 
3.2.4 Access  to  capital 
Access to capital depends, among other things, on the wealth holdings of a prospective 
entrepreneur. It is generally observed that entrepreneurs tend to hold more wealth than 
wage-labourers. For instance in the USA entrepreneurs hold a disproportionate amount   12
of wealth: Cagetti and De Nardi (2006:839) report that while entrepreneurs comprised 
7.6 per cent of the population in 1989, they owned 33 per cent of total wealth. Also, 81 
per cent of those in the top 1 per cent of the wealth distribution were entrepreneurs. 
Hurst and Lusardi (2006:3) report that the median wealth of households owning a 
business is three times higher than those not owning a business. 
The observation that entrepreneurs are wealthier than wage-earners has been taken as 
evidence of capital constraints on start-ups. The argument is that under constrained 
capital markets, individual wealth (including inheritances, bequests, and lottery 
winnings), and informal credit markets will be a determinant of the start-up rate. 
Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) it has been realized that capital markets could 
provide inadequate finance to entrepreneurs due to moral hazard and limited liability 
problems (Paulson et al. 2006:102).17 The key initial insight in the context of start-ups 
have been formalized by Evans and Jovanovic (1989). In their model, the significance 
of wealth as a determinant of start-ups is interpreted to signify that potential 
entrepreneurs are credit-constrained. 
A number of subsequent models have qualified and modified this result. Banerjee and 
Newman (1993) model the role of individual wealth within the occupational choice 
between entrepreneurship and wage employment. This has macroeconomic implications 
for a country’s wealth distribution and overall start-up rate—as was mentioned, 
entrepreneurs tend to be disproportionately wealthy. According to Mesnard and 
Ravallion (2005:3) ‘greater wealth equality implies that fewer potential entrepreneurs 
are able to finance start-up capital’. A number of extensions modify this result to find 
that inheritances (bequests), household savings, and even lottery windfalls are 
associated with a higher probability that an individual will be self-employed 
(Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000; Gentry and Hubbard 
2000; Lindh and Ohlsson 1996). Again this assumes that the significance of wealth may 
indicate that potential entrepreneurs are credit-constrained. Cagetti and De Nardi 
(2005a; 2005b) construct a dynamic occupation choice model that shows with credit 
constraints the distribution of wealth determines the amount of investment in the 
economy, the rate of start-ups, and the size distribution of firms. Relaxing credit 
constraints raises the start-up rate, leads to increases in the average size of firms, and 
reduces wealth inequalities. This indirectly offers a channel for start-ups to affect 
economic growth, since it implies that restrictions on occupation choice (for 
entrepreneurship) will reduce investment and raise inequalities (which may or may not 
be good for economic growth). 
The impact of wealth inequality on entrepreneurial occupational choice may depend on 
start-up costs (Mesnard and Ravallion 2005). When start-up costs are high, wealth 
inequalities increase the rate of start-ups, and conversely with low start-up costs wealth 
inequalities reduce the rate of start-ups. With start-up costs, the relationship between 
wealth and start-ups are weakened because start-up costs depress the marginal value of 
being an entrepreneur as a function of wealth (Fonseca et al. 2007). The significance of 
                                                 
17  Limited liability refers to bank requirements that an entrepreneur provide collateral to obtain a loan so 
as to limit their exposure in the case of default. Moral hazard occurs because banks cannot observe 
entrepreneurial ability and effort and if the entrepreneurs do not have their own wealth invested in the 
firm, might have less incentive to scale up their effort in the running of the firm (Paulson et al. 
2006:102).   13
start-up costs creates a clear link between the first and second transition phases in the 
establishment of a firm, as it implies that the start-up process itself will influence the 
initial occupational-choice decision.18 
Not all models and empirical evidence attach the same importance to wealth in the 
occupational choice and start-up decision, and even where the effects of wealth on start-
ups are not in question, the interpretation that this imply constraints in the credit market 
has been doubted. Hurst and Lusardi (2004:319) for instance construct a model and find 
empirical evidence showing that most wealth distribution has little significant impact on 
the start-up rate, and only has a significant positive impact after the 95th percentile. 
They are also critical of the view that the empirical finding in earlier literature whereby 
wealth is a significant predictor of start-ups reflects credit market constraints, 
recognizing that wealth itself may be endogenous (a point also stressed by Blanchflower 
and Oswald 1998:27). Proxies for wealth such as inheritances may be flawed given that 
inheritances might be more likely in families with characteristics that are favourable 
towards entrepreneurship (e.g. entrepreneurial ability) (Hurst and Lusardi 2004:336). 
Fonseca et al. (2007) present an occupational choice model where the existence of start-
up costs ‘flatten’ the relationship between wealth and the probability of someone 
starting a new firm. Thus in countries with similar wealth levels, differences in start-up 
costs would result in different start-up rates. 
The role of wealth in entrepreneurial occupational choices is not only confined to 
overcoming imperfections in credit markets. Newman (2007:2) argues that wealth will 
be a determinant of entrepreneurship, due to the need for wealthier individuals to 
assume more risk, so as to earn more income, to achieve similar utility from income as 
less wealthy persons. 
Finally, the significance of credit as a constraint on start-ups can be shown to depend on 
the relative productivity of human capital in wage work and self-employment. Åstebro 
and Bernhardt (2005:71) find that entrepreneurs with high human capital (as proxied by 
education and experience) have greater financial wealth and more start-up capital, 
implying that human capital may reduce the frictions caused by lack of credit. 
3.2  Growth, survival, and exit 
Research on the final phases of firm creation has focused on the determinants of 
existing firm growth and firm size, and research on the survival and failure (or exit) of 
firms. Influential contributions in this literature include Lucas (1978), Jovanovic (1982), 
Hopenhayn (1992), Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), and Ericson and Pakes (1995). In 
this section I discuss these and other contributions with reference to firm growth and 
size (3.2.1), firm exit (3.2.3), and serial entrepreneurs (3.2.4). 
                                                 
18  The relationship between start-up costs, wealth inequality and start-ups has implications for economic 
growth and development. It suggest that in a developing country context where start-up costs are low, 
a small outward shift in the wealth distribution may have a substantial positive impact on the number 
of start-ups (Rapoport 2002:1).   14
3.2.1 Firm growth and size 
According to Desai et al. (2003:6) research on firm growth and size has been concerned 
to determine if firm growth is independent of firm size (‘Gibrat’s Law’), and has 
generally found that smaller firms tend to grow faster (2003:7). It is also the case that 
smaller firms have ‘higher and more variable growth rates’ (Jovanovic 1982:649). 
Lucas (1978) shows that the growth in firm size is a result of the growth in the ratio of 
entrepreneurs to workers: as the economy grows and wages rise, entrepreneurs with less 
ability will exit and become wage-labourers, while entrepreneurs will higher ability (and 
‘control spans’) will face relative better incentives to manage larger firms. Similarly, 
Murphy et al. (1991) show that firm size is related to entrepreneurial ‘talent’ so that 
more talented entrepreneurs end up with larger firms. Cabral and Mata (2003:1082) find 
empirical evidence for this from Portugal. 
Cabral and Mata (2003:1079) linked firm size and growth to financial constraints faced 
by the firms. They argue that if young entrepreneurs are more subject to financial 
constraints, the size-distribution of a given cohort of new firms would be right-skewed. 
Indeed, from a sample of Portuguese firms they find that a firm owned by a young 
entrepreneur would be 30 per cent smaller than a firm owned by an older entrepreneur 
(2003:1082). Over time, as some of these firms overcome financial constraints, they 
will grow in size and the size-distribution will become more symmetrical. 
The question that arises is why do we see so many small and even micro-firms in the 
least developed countries? According to the occupational choice models discussed 
above this may be due to a large number of firms started by individuals with little 
entrepreneurial ability, who would have preferred to be in wage-employment. Indeed 
firm size in Africa has been found to be positively related to the educational and skill 
levels of the entrepreneur (Ndulu et al. 2007:68). Small firm size may also be a 
symptom of economy-wide uncertainty, where the probability of success is small 
(Wiggens 1995). Such conditions characterize many developing countries. Wiggens 
(1995) shows that under such conditions large firms face greater costs to provide 
sufficient incentives to retain committed workers: they may be successful, but they 
cannot commit to high wages beforehand as this would imply a large cost if they fail. In 
contrast, a small firm can allow the entrepreneur to earn potentially large returns if the 
firm is successful, while if the firm is unsuccessful no large commitments (costs) are 
incurred. This argument is also offered as an explanation for the use of franchises, 
where larger firms offer a franchise where an individual’s reward is determined by 
profits rather that a fixed wage as employee (Wiggens 1995:68). 
Small firm size may also be a symptom of personal management/family ownership of 
firms, which without the right environment could reduce growth. This is because in 
many such firms the objective is to maintain the entrepreneur’s lifestyle, be it survivalist 
or merely to ensure sufficient cash flow (Teece 1993:208). Small firms may also be a 
symptom of the fact that firms cannot exploit economies of scale of scope—not only 
due to liquidity constraints but because of a lack of transport infrastructure and transport 
services (Tirole 1988; Acs 2006; Banerjee and Duflo 2007). The preponderance of 
small firms in some developing countries may be due to path-dependence and that other 
countries exploited a first-mover advantage in the exploitation of technologies, 
providing for large scale production (Chandler 1990).   15
3.2.2 Firm exit 
Not all start-ups last long. In fact the exit rate of new firms (or rate of firm turnover) is 
high in all countries where it has been studied. For instance Hopenhayn (1992:1127) 
notes that in the US about 40 per cent of manufacturing firms exit within five years. 
Cressy (2006:103) declares that ‘most firms die young’, citing the finding that a 
significant proportion (50 per cent) of firms exit the market after only 18 to 24 months. 
Abbring and Campbell (2003) argue that the entrepreneur’s option to exit the market is 
in itself a value, and calculate based on a sample of firms from the US that most of the 
value of new firms may be due to this option. Sunk costs also have an influence on the 
decision of when to exit: they find that exit rates immediately after entry are low, but 
rise during the year with most exits occurring at the end of a year before fixed costs 
(such as annual rents) have to be paid. This echoes Dixit’s (1989) finding that the 
existence of sunk costs will result in a degree of hysteresis in a firm’s participation in 
the market. 
That entrepreneurs exit from self-employment does not necessary mean that they have 
been unsuccessful (Andersson 2006:31). Most firm exits have been found to be 
voluntary (up to 80 per cent) and not necessarily due to firm failure (Taylor 1999: C140; 
Cressy 2006:114). There are various reasons for people exiting from self-employment, 
which may include business failure (Jovanovic 1982), increases in the opportunity costs 
of being self-employed such as increases in wages (Andersson 2006), and retirement, 
which may result in a firm being transferred to a new generation (Kanniainen and 
Poutvaara 2007). Thus firms may be discontinued (e.g. through voluntary closure or 
liquidation) or sold on the market, or passed on to family members. This has generated a 
literature on the market for firms, on the factors that determine when entrepreneurial 
entry would take the form of the purchase of an existing firm rather than the creation of 
a new firm, and on family firms (Bertrand and Schoar 2006). 
According to Kanbur (1979) and Jovanovic (1982), new entrepreneurs are at first not 
aware of the extent of their entrepreneurial ability, and as they perform in self-
employment they are able to form a clearer view, according to which they may continue 
their firm, or exit. In a similar manner Ericson and Pakes (1995:55) state that 
entrepreneurs make recognize potentially profitable opportunities, but must invest in 
order to ‘learn the value of the opportunity’. Once they have determined that the returns 
to their investment are smaller than the opportunity costs, they will exit. In these cases 
the exit decision by the firm is a rational decision. Reynolds (1993:16-17) notes that ‘a 
dramatic drop in the risk of discontinuance occurs after about four to five years’. This 
would suggest that entrepreneurial self-assessment takes places within three to four 
years at most. Self-assessment of ability after a period may also account for the firms of 
younger entrepreneurs having higher exit rates (Taylor 1999), because younger 
entrepreneurs tend to be less risk-averse, and as such take on more risky activities, 
which they do not however have the entrepreneurial ability to manage (Cressy 
2006:103). 
Gartner (1985) sees firm survival during these initial years as dependent on 
entrepreneurial ability to differentiate his or her products from those of competitors. 
Cressy (2006) sees it as dependent on the ability of entrepreneurs to reduce the 
uncertainty that they face, e.g. through diversification. Gimeno et al. (1997) show that 
firm survival depends not only on realized profits but on thresholds of accepted firm 
performance. This can be firm-specific depending on the assets, mobility, and   16
characteristics of the firm’s owners including the non-pecuniary benefits of self-
employment. 
A second category of reasons for firm or entrepreneurial discontinuity is due to changes 
in the opportunity costs of being an entrepreneur: either entrepreneurship becomes less 
attractive or wage-employment (or unemployment) becomes more attractive (Andersson 
2006:4). Some of these factors may be outside of the control of the entrepreneur, in 
other words, it may be due to ‘bad luck’ (Cressy 2006:114). Both adverse as well as 
positive changes in economic growth/market demand will affect entrepreneurial exit. 
For instance adverse changes in economic growth/market demand may result in profits 
falling below the acceptable threshold and cause the entrepreneur to exit (a ‘push’ 
factor) (Andersson 2006). This implies that situations of economic stagnation will not 
only be a cause of higher self-employment due to necessity entrepreneurship, but also 
higher rates of firm failure (Bosma et al. 2005:35). 
Although general economic stagnation on a macroeconomic level can lead to firms 
exiting due to falling profit levels, there may also be changes on an industry level that 
could lead to firms exiting a particular industry, even if macroeconomic conditions are 
good. In this regard Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) derive a model that shows how 
industry-level dynamics can drive firm growth and exit. They imagine an industry that 
starts out with a small number of firms, who face high prices (and profits). This will 
encourage new firm entry, so the total number of firms as well as output in the industry 
will rise. As the number of firms rises, competition will increase, and firms will 
increasingly innovate (and raise the effectiveness of A in equation 1) to improve their 
competitiveness. This increase in the rates of competition innovation will make it 
progressively more difficult for new firms to enter, will increase the optimal scale of the 
firm’s production, and will put pressure on less efficient firms (the ‘technological 
laggards’) to exit (1994:324). With prices falling at the same time, the rate of output 
growth will slow down, to a level where a greater number of firms will exit. This model 
is therefore offered to explain the frequent industry ‘shake-outs’ that have been 
observed as particular industries emerge and mature. Holmes and Schmitz (1990) in an 
earlier model suggested a similar motivation for firm exit, where old firms need to close 
down to free resources to form new firms that can embody new technologies. 
In contrast to adverse macroeconomic circumstance or industry-level shake-outs, 
improvements in macroeconomic conditions may have both positive and negative 
effects on the rate of self-employment. On the one hand, it may send a signal of 
potentially good returns to innovation for high-ability entrepreneurs, leading them to 
enter and remain in the market. On the other hand the higher accompanying wages will 
lead to entrepreneurs with relative better ability as workers, to opt for wage-
employment instead. Often, the better education entrepreneurs can earn higher wages so 
that they are among the first to exit. Nafziger and Terrell (1996:695) point out that 
formal education often does not contribute to entrepreneurial ability, as they found in a 
sample from India that new firms established by formally well-educated entrepreneurs 
are less likely to survive because they face better opportunities in wage-employment 
and rent-seeking. 
A third category of motivations for entrepreneurial exit concerns the retirement of   
the entrepreneur. In this case a successful firm will either be discontinued, sold on the   17
market to another entrepreneur, or passed on to a new generation—stays within the 
family.19 Kannianen and Poutvaara (2007) model the inter-generational dynamics of 
entrepreneurs using an overlapping generation model. They show that informational 
failures exist in the market for firms, and that this will result in a tendency for high-
quality firms to be more often transferred within a family than sold to external 
entrepreneurs. This might however limit entrepreneurial entry as well as lower the 
average ability of the entrepreneurial pool in an economy as the efficiency of the 
transfer of tacit knowledge from an entrepreneur to family members will depend on 
their talent (Kannianen and Poutvaara 2007:692). Given that these informational 
failures tend to be more prevalent in poor and developing countries, one could expect a 
predominance of (less efficient) family-owned firms in these countries. Parker (2007: 
699) also suggests a predominance of family firms in countries where property rights 
and legal protection for investors are weak, since keeping the firm within the family 
may reduce ‘costly monitoring’ of outside entrepreneurs (see also Bertrand and Schoar 
2006).  
3.2.3 Starting again 
Once an entrepreneur has discontinued a firm and exited from being self-employed, it is 
often observed that he or she will start a new firm. This has been termed ‘renascent’ 
entrepreneurship (Stam et al. 2007a) or ‘habitual’ entrepreneurship, which include 
‘serial’ entrepreneurs, and ‘portfolio’ entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran et al. 2006:4-5).20 A 
significant portion of existing entrepreneurs at any point in time are habitual 
entrepreneurs. Holmes and Schmitz (1990:269) argue that they make a particular 
contribution to economic development by facilitating the division of labour. 
Stam et al. (2007a) investigate the extent and determinants of renascent entrepreneurs, 
and ask why a person should become an entrepreneur again after having failed the first 
time. This is because firm failure could indicate that a person does not have sufficient 
entrepreneurial ability. Their answer is that entrepreneurial ability is not a fixed quality, 
but can be developed if learning takes place. Then whether or not a person would start a 
new firm after having failed the first time, will depend on his or her capacity to learn 
from experience (Stam et al. 2007a:4). That this could be important is suggested by the 
findings of Baptista et al. (2007) that firms started by habitual entrepreneurs have a 
higher probability of survival. 
Habitual entrepreneurs have also been found to be significantly motivated by non-
pecuniary benefits of entrepreneurship, such as a desire for independence (Wright et al. 
1997; Ucbasaran et al. 2006). Holmes and Schmitz (1990) model habitual entrepreneurs 
as following from the ‘occupational’ decision of certain individuals to specialize in 
entrepreneurship: their investments in new firms are essentially investments in their 
own entrepreneurial ability. Giannetti and Simonov (2004:279) emphasize the 
                                                 
19    Bertrand and Schoar (2006) provide a survey of the recent research into family businesses, in 
particularly discussing efficiency-based and cultural theories of family businesses.  
20  Serial entrepreneurs are defined as ‘individuals who have sold or closed at least one business … and 
currently have a minority or majority ownership stake in a single independent business’, and portfolio 
entrepreneurs are defined as ‘individuals who currently have minority or majority ownership stakes in 
two or more independent businesses’ (Ucbasaran et al. 2006:5).   18
importance of social norms in an entrepreneurs decision to start (and re-start) a firm, as 
these will determine whether or not there is a stigma attached to failure. 
Habitual entrepreneurs seem to make up a significant proportion of the self-employed in 
developed countries, and one may expect the same to be the case in developing 
countries. There is however a gap in the literature on the extent and motivations of serial 
entrepreneurship in developing countries. 
4  Entrepreneurship in economic development 
Economic development is the process of structural transformation of an economy 
towards a modern, technologically advanced economy based on services and 
manufacturing. This process involves not only qualitative changes to the nature of an 
economy, but also accompanying quantitative changes in terms of the productivity and 
output per person. If these qualitative and quantitative changes result in unambiguous 
improvements in human welfare, it is generally seen as economic ‘development’. In 
both the qualitative as well as the quantitative dimensions of economic development 
entrepreneurship could make a positive contribution to economic development. In the 
popular press entrepreneurship is depicted as important for economic development; seen 
to create jobs, ease fiscal burden, and provides competition. 
Entrepreneurship could also, of course, as was implied in section 2, have a negative 
impact on economic development. In this section I will first discuss the positive role of 
entrepreneurship in economic development, specifically focusing on structural 
economic change and growth acceleration (section 4.1), and thereafter (section 4.2) 
exploring ways in which entrepreneurship may undermine economic development. 
Section 4.3 contains empirical evidence and reconciles this with the theory in sections 
4.1 and 4.2. 
4.1  Structural economic transformation, innovation-driven growth,  
and entrepreneurship 
High economic growth and rising per capita income are relatively recent phenomena in 
human evolutionary history. Human society has on the whole, lived in a traditional, 
subsistence state. Hansen and Prescott (2002) distinguish between the pre-industrial era 
(termed ‘Malthusian’) and the post-industrial era (called the ‘Solow’, or ‘era of modern 
growth’). They argue that the transition from the Malthusian (subsistence) era to the 
Solow era is characterized by a change in technology based on land, to a technology 
based on physical and human capital accumulation. The adoption of new technology 
first and foremost required specialization, which in turn required a sufficiently large 
market (Goodfriend and McDermott 1995:117). Once population growth and 
urbanization offered larger markets, as well as the conditions for reaping economies of 
scale, and people started investing in the quality of their offspring rather than the 
quantity (Galor and Moav 2001; 2002), economic growth took off. This process has 
recently been formalized in ‘unified growth models that are consistent with an epoch of 
Malthusian stagnation and the transition from Malthusian stagnation to sustained 
growth’ (Galor and Moav 2001:720). Once this take-off started, economic development 
entailed a transformation from the traditional sector, to the modern sector, as is   19
formalized in dual economy models following Lewis (1954) and Ranis and Fei (1961). 
Understanding the role of the entrepreneur in economic development and growth 
therefore entails an understanding of the role that the entrepreneur played in the 
Malthusian era, in the transition from Malthusian stagnation to growth, in transforming 
the economy structurally from a traditional, agricultural based economy to a modern 
industrial economy, and finally in sustaining growth based on innovation (knowledge 
capital). According to Murphy et al. (2006:12) it was the ‘advent of entrepreneurship’ 
that allowed per capita income to grow exponentially in the West from the 1700s. 
It can be argued that during the Malthusian era the problem was one of low levels of 
entrepreneurial ability and fewer opportunities whose exploitation would have resulted 
in economic growth. Over time however, growing population density—as a result   
of growing urbanization21—and basic technological progress in agriculture and 
transport, created large enough agglomerations where opportunities started to arise.22 
Specialization created learning and innovation and made the adoption and the spread of 
new technology much faster (Goodfriend and McDermott 1995:117). Another benefit 
included incentives for investing in entrepreneurial capital (e.g. through serial start-ups) 
It also provided incentives for investment in human capital, which facilitated the switch 
in a parental (household) strategy of quality rather than quantity of offspring (described 
in Galor and Moav 2002). 
There are two ways in which this switch would have made possible a significant 
increase in entrepreneurial ability and effectiveness during this transformation (Cagetti 
and De Nardi 2005:21). First, parents transfer human capital, in particular tacit 
knowledge, to their children. For entrepreneurship this may be an important source of 
entrepreneurial ability, as it is often found that children of entrepreneurs are more likely 
to become entrepreneurs themselves (Davidsson and Honig 2005; Stam et al. 2007a). 
Second, parents transfer capital to their children (e.g. through inheritance), which 
provides them with the capital base needed to support their entrepreneurial ventures. 
The ‘take-off’ from Malthusian stagnation to growth as depicted in unified growth 
models, can be argued to correspond to the start of modern sector growth in dual 
economy models in development economics. These dual economy models aim to 
explain the structural transformation of underdeveloped economies, and are inspired by 
seminal contributions of Lewis (1954)23 and Ranis and Fei (1961). 
In these dual economy models, economic transformation involves the co-existence, at 
least for a period, of a traditional (often described as the agricultural, informal, or 
subsistence) sector and a modern (based on services and manufacturing) sector, and the 
movement of labour from the traditional to the modern sector. Labour flow out of the 
traditional sector to the modern sector due to the latter’s higher productivity (and 
                                                 
21  Duranton and Puga (2001) argues that cities act as ‘nurseries’ for firm creation and growth, finding 
evidence that new firm start-ups are proportionately higher in cities. 
22  Maddison (1982) noted a dramatic acceleration in European growth after 1700, as compared to the 
previous period. These were accompanied by significant growth in population and urbanization 
(Goodfriend and McDermott, 1995:117). 
23  According to Kirkpatrick and Barrientos (2004:2) the Lewis model ‘is widely regarded as the single 
most influential contribution to the establishment of development economics as an academic 
discipline’.   20
wages)—underpinned by the Lewis assumption that labour’s marginal productivity in 
the traditional sector is zero. If the traditional sector is equated with the agricultural/ 
rural sector, then this outflow results in the contribution of agriculture to total GDP to 
decline, the share of the population living in urban areas to increase, and average per 
capita incomes to rise. Growth is due to higher productivity in the modern sector and an 
increase in aggregate demand due to higher wages that are paid in the modern sector 
(Rada 2007:713). This transformation can also be consistent with an inverse-U 
relationship between per capita income and income inequality, as observed by Kuznets 
(1955).24 A number of extensions were made to address some of the simplifying 
assumptions of the Lewis model. The popularity of dual economy models in 
development economics therefore lies in their ability to explain a number of stylized 
facts of international development over the past century. 
Where is the entrepreneur in these dual economy models? Although Lewis did not use 
the term ‘entrepreneur’, he very much had the entrepreneur in mind in the modern 
sector agents described as ‘capitalists’. These agents, to be contrasted from workers who 
get paid a wage according to their marginal productivity, share in the surplus production 
in the modern sector. Moreover, in the Lewis model the assumption is that these 
capitalists (entrepreneurs) have much higher savings rates than workers, and that they 
re-invest their surpluses in expanding the modern sector.25 For Lewis (1954:155) a rise 
in total savings in an economy is a prerequisite for economic development. In theory, 
three reasons have been noted for entrepreneurs’ higher propensity to save: one, to 
accumulate enough capital to start or expand a business in the presence of credit market 
failures (see section 3.3); two, to reduce the need for expensive borrowing and; three, as 
a precaution given that entrepreneurship carries more risk than wage employment 
(Cagetti and De Nardi 2005:18). As long as there are ‘unlimited supplies of labour’ the 
wages in the modern sector will remain constant, allowing capitalists to reap and 
reinvest their surpluses. A weakness in these traditional dual economy models (see also 
Bourguignon 1990) is that although there are ‘capitalists’, it is assumed that they are 
exogenously given as a constant proportion of the population, so that none of the 
concerns in occupational choice models arises. 
Dias and McDermott (2006) provide a model in which entrepreneurs in the modern 
sector provide an environment where human capital accumulation can take place, 
provided that the institutional framework is conducive. They combine a dual economy 
model with an occupational choice model wherein people are born either as workers, or 
as managers. Workers can choose to work in the traditional sector, or they can migrate 
to the modern sector. For the latter a minimum level of human capital is needed. 
Managers, all of whom are in the modern sector, can choose between being productive 
entrepreneurs or to be rent-seekers. For the former they would need to cover start-up 
                                                 
24  Bourguignon (1990:215) points out that in dual economy models, inequality will be low (zero) when 
all the workers are in the traditional sector, highest when the population is split between the two, and 
zero again when all the workers are in the modern sector. This assumes that there is no inequality 
within the modern sector between capitalists and workers, which is contrary to empirical evidence that 
points to significant differences in income and wealth between workers and capitalists (entrepreneurs). 
25    Quadrini (1999; 2000) finds that entrepreneurs have much higher savings rates than workers. 
Henrekson (2007:733) argues that the impact of savings on the start-up rate may depend on the form 
that savings take. If saving schemes restrict the owners’ control of their savings it may be of limited 
use as funds or collateral to start up a firm.   21
costs, and pay taxes. Their model shows that the better entrepreneurial ability are, the 
more workers will migrate to the modern sector, and the higher will be the overall levels 
of human capital accumulation in the economy. They support their model’s implications 
with panel data from Brazilian states. 
Unlimited supplies of labour will of course not provide surpluses (profits) indefinitely, 
and as the stock of capital increases as a result of investment by entrepreneurs, its 
marginal product could start to decline. Thus, other sources of productivity growth are 
required to sustain and accelerate economic growth in the modern sector once the 
structural transformation has crossed a particular threshold. Peretto (1999) provides a 
modified endogenous growth model that implies long-run structural transformation 
depends on the degree to which an economy can make a transition from a growth path 
driven by capital accumulation (‘the Solow economy’ as happens during the period of 
labour surplus when capitalists invest their surplus profits in the Lewis model) to a 
growth path driven by knowledge accumulation (the endogenous growth or ‘innovation-
driven’ economy). Knowledge accumulation (including technological innovation) is 
recognized to be easier in certain activities (such as in manufacturing and services) and 
contexts—such as in urban agglomerations. 
Three interrelated sources of productivity growth that determines how an economy 
makes the transition from capital-accumulation to knowledge are the allocation of talent 
(e.g. Murphy et al. 1991), the accumulation of human capital (e.g. Peretto 1999), and 
technological progress (Ciccone and Matsuyama 1996). 
Murphy et al (1991) emphasize ‘entrepreneurial talent’ (ability) and show that firm size 
and the growth of the economy is determined by entrepreneurial ability. They suggest it 
is important that most talent become entrepreneurs (1991:510). Nelson and Pack (1999) 
use a dual economy model to explain the structural transformation of economies such as 
Korea and Taiwan from being characterized by a ‘craft’ sector to a ‘modern’ economy. 
They assign a key role to the ‘effectiveness of entrepreneurship’ (or entrepreneurial 
ability, which they denote by e), which they see as a vital determinant of the   
rate of assimilation of technology (1999:420). They stress the imitative role of 
entrepreneurship as well as its role in taking on uncertainty, given that the adoption of 
(mostly) foreign technology by entrepreneurs in these countries entails significant risk-
taking (1999:418). As in Rada (2007), entrepreneurs ‘trigger’ an investment in the 
modern sector once they have perceived profitable opportunities (the ‘take-off’ from 
Malthusian stagnation), and facilitate the re-allocation of production factors from the 
traditional to the modern sector. Since the modern sector requires a higher level of 
skilled labour, entrepreneurs cause an increase in the demand for educated labour. This 
leads to an overall improvement in human capital in a country, in turn facilitating the 
imitation and adoption of foreign technology.26 Their model implies that a ‘rapid’ 
expansion of skilled labour can only be absorbed if entrepreneurial ability is high, and 
that without entrepreneurial ability the returns to physical and human capital is low 
(Nelson and Pack 1999:423). 
Knowledge accumulation requires high levels of innovation, which results in more 
complex production methods, the increasing production of specialized intermediate 
                                                 
26  Keller (2004:752) point out that for most countries, foreign sources of technology account for 90 per 
cent or more of local productivity growth.   22
inputs (Ciccone and Matsuyama 1996:33), and an increase in the technological intensity 
of a country’s economic structure (Pereira et al. 2007). Thus, the transformation from a 
low-income, traditional economy to a modern economy also involves significant 
changes to production methods, a process of change where entrepreneurs provide 
essential roles: first, in creating new firms outside of the household, which offer new 
products; and second, in growing firms (and wage employment) by making use of scale 
economies. Such larger firms tend to specialize, and the clustering of specialized firms 
can give rise to localization economies, further encouraging innovation and 
specialization. 
During the stage where growth and productivity is driven by knowledge accumulation, 
countries must generate, as well as commercialize, new knowledge. This requires, 
amongst others, cooperation between researchers and entrepreneurs: researchers/ 
inventors need in many cases to be matched with suitable entrepreneurs (Michelacci 
2003).27 One way of improving this cooperation or matching is through linkages 
between universities (researchers), private firms (entrepreneurs), and government 
(subsiding research and development—R&D) (Wennekers et al. 2005:295). 
Although many developing country governments are spending substantial amounts on 
innovation and R&D subsidies, and in establishing university–private sector cooperation 
through for instance establishment of science parks, little research has studied these 
attempts. Generally, the suggestions from the literature are that poor countries should 
not be focusing their attention on R&D/new knowledge generation, but rather in 
imitation and technological catching-up (see e.g. Estrin et al. 2006:697). 
Schmitz (1989) stressed the importance of imitation by entrepreneurs and argues that it 
may be more important for the majority of developing countries than new knowledge 
generation. He presents a model in which entrepreneurs imitate and implement existing 
technology, and learn-by-imitation. A simplifying assumption in his model is that 
technology is easily observable and commonly available. This is not always the case. In 
fact according to Nelson and Pack (1999), there is great uncertainty in the adoption of 
foreign technology, and a measure of the ability of entrepreneurs is how well they 
shoulder this risk. Furthermore, not all imitation is costless: Holmes and Schmitz (1990) 
point to many new innovations, such as locating or managing a firm, that are costly to 
imitate. 
The process of change involving the composition of goods produced in an economy has 
interesting implications for the development of entrepreneurship itself, so that 
entrepreneurship may be itself endogenous in the development process. Ciccone and 
Matsuyama (1996) explains this in a model where they make a distinction between 
consumer goods and intermediate goods. If a particular economy produces a limited range 
of intermediate goods, they show that the final (consumer) goods sector will use 
‘primitive’ production methods and will have little demand for sophisticated, new inputs. 
This will lead to lower incentives for potential entrepreneurs to start-up new firms 
(1996:34). The economy can get stuck in such an underdevelopment trap with primitive 
production in its (small) modern sector. They also point out that there might, in such an 
                                                 
27    Researchers, who ‘produce inventions’ and entrepreneurs, who ‘implement them’, need to be 
matched: if not, the returns to innovation will be lower, and innovation effort will decline, with 
adverse consequences for productivity growth and competitiveness (Michelacci 2003:207).   23
‘underdevelopment trap’ be a case for assistance to new start-ups since these can provide 
both pecuniary and technological externalities if they start producing new intermediate 
goods—which will induce final good producers to demand more of these (in turn 
improving the incentives for other entrepreneurs to start-up firms due to greater demand 
and the example provided in the application new technology). In this model, start-ups face 
positive start-up costs that include R&D activities in bringing a new good to the market. 
That entrepreneurs create a positive externality through bringing new goods to the 
market and in the process illustrate how new technology can be applied, has been 
extended by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) who point out that entrepreneurs provide not 
only these technological externalities in bringing new goods to market, but further 
pecuniary externalities by providing information on the profitability of new activities. In 
this sense entrepreneurs fulfil a ‘cost-discovery’ function in making sunk costs in a new 
activity which ex ante may or may not be profitable, but which will provide information 
ex post on such profitability to other entrepreneurs. In so doing, entrepreneurs provide 
information on what an economy can be good at producing, which in the context of 
developing countries is information that may be fundamentally lacking and thus subject 
to uncertainty (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003). 
One implication from these strands of models is that it may in fact not be primarily 
through existing firms that economic structural transformation and growth may be 
driven, but through in the creation of new firms, i.e. start-ups. Research suggests that 
start-up firms are the ones most likely to grow (Lingelbach et al. 2005; Johnson et al. 
2000) and to create new jobs (Audretsch et al. 2006:25; McMillan and Woodruff 
2002:166). In many transition countries, where there was no significant private sector to 
start out with, new firms often strengthened reforms by improving economic conditions, 
as for instance in China (McMillan and Woodruff 2002:153). New firms can be 
important in a transition context since they are ‘less encumbered with the historic 
influences of such a society’, as opposed to existing firms that may be undergoing 
reform, and that some form of private sector development could be a condition for 
successful privatization of inefficient state-owned firms (Estrin et al. 2006:693). 
Finally, an aspect of duality that is receiving increasing attention is that between the 
formal and informal sector. Zenou (2007) presents a dual economy model where the 
duality is not in a traditional/modern sector as such, but in the labour market. This 
mirrors the reality in many developing countries where the labour market is fragmented 
into an informal and formal sector (Maloney 2004). The informal sector mostly consists 
of self-employed (entrepreneurs) persons, and as pointed out by Zenou (2007:1) is 
substantial in many developing countries, for instance accounting for between 20 to 80 
per cent of non-agricultural employment in Africa. The formal sector consists largely of 
wage-employment, and is characterized by high unemployment rates. High 
unemployment and vacancies co-exist in the formal sector due to job-search frictions, 
which do not exist in the informal sector where job-seekers can create their own firms, 
or enter into employment with informal family-owned firms. De Paula and Scheinkman 
(2007) find that informal firms are often a form of ‘evasive’ entrepreneurship in order to 
evade taxes or regulations, or to engage in illegal trade. They also find that they are less 
efficient, less able to obtain finance, and more likely to be dominated by entrepreneurs 
of low ability, as measured by educational attainment (De Paula and Scheinkman 
2007:4). Thus to a large degree, the informal sector appears much like the traditional/ 
subsistence sector in typical dual economy models, which suggests a path to faster 
growth by allowing entrepreneurs of high ability to ‘migrate’ to the formal sector.   24
4.2 Undermining economic development 
There are various ways in which entrepreneurship is identified to undermine economic 
development, thus not all types of entrepreneurship are good for economic 
development. As a consequence there has even been an argument for a tax on 
entrepreneurship. Herein I will briefly review this literature. The most salient adverse 
effects of entrepreneurship can be due to either: (a) perverse allocation towards 
activities that are personally profitable but socially destructive or unproductive; and  
(b) low quality entrepreneurship that may have negative externalities. 
4.2.1 Perverse allocation of entrepreneurial talent 
We have identified a view of entrepreneurship, associated with Baumol (1990), Murphy 
et al. (1991), Acemoglu (1995), Mehlum et al. (2003), Coyne and Leeson (2004), and 
others, that see entrepreneurship as a ubiquitous in society, but with different impacts on 
economic development, which will depend on whether entrepreneurial ability is 
allocated towards productive, or non-productive, destructive or evasive ends (recall 
section 2). The latter, perverse allocation—the ‘misallocation’ of entrepreneurial ability 
may hinder economic development (Acemoglu 1995; Mehlum et al. 2003). 
It is not only the absence of good institutions that may result in the inappropriate 
allocation of entrepreneurial ability. Slow economic growth in itself may cause the 
wrong allocation of ability and entrepreneurship. For instance, it is well known that 
when economic growth is low and employment opportunities in the formal sector are 
scarce, that self-employment will rise, and that this rise will include a large proportion 
of people with low levels of entrepreneurial ability. However, during periods of low 
economic growth the incentives for innovation, as in bringing new goods to market, will 
be low, since the demand for new goods tends to have an income elasticity of greater 
than one. Entrepreneurs of high ability will therefore engage in rent-seeking activities 
rather than productive entrepreneurship, and this re-allocation of entrepreneurial talent 
will be greater in countries with higher levels of wealth or natural resources from which 
rents may be extracted (Murphy et al. 1991:520). Thus in such circumstances the quality 
of the entrepreneurial pool in a country worsens from both the inflow of low-ability 
entrepreneurs as well as the outflow of high-ability entrepreneurs. This will lead to 
further restrictions from the side of credit markets, in the form of higher interest and/or 
collateral requirements—which may further push out talented entrepreneurs. The 
consequence is that poor countries may be caught in a self-reinforcing ‘entrepreneurial’ 
development trap. 
Mehlum et al. (2003:276) present a model to show how a poor country can become 
trapped in low development as a result of the misallocation of entrepreneurial talent 
towards what they term ‘predation’. In their model, an entrepreneur must make a choice 
between becoming a ‘predator’ or ‘prey’ (i.e. a producer). Predator activities include 
theft, extortion, bribery, and fraud. Economic growth and development itself will 
influence this choice: they state that ‘at a low level of development, predation is more 
attractive than at higher levels’. This is because of insecure property rights. Economic 
growth and the inflow of new entrepreneurs is, in their model, an escape from this trap, 
as economic growth increases the incentives/profits from productive activities, as well 
as increasing the ability of government to improve law enforcement. Such a new inflow 
of entrepreneurs have been argued to undermine vested interests and even ‘crowd-out’ 
rents by providing new and substitute opportunities (Baland and Francois 2000:528).   25
This is however also an important reason why new entrepreneurial ventures are often 
repressed in many poor countries. 
Finally, Naudé (2007) discusses the role of entrepreneurs during and after conflict, and 
points out that the activities of entrepreneurs during conflict, especially of ‘destructive’ 
entrepreneurs who benefit from the conflict, may make post-conflict transition difficult 
to achieve. He argues that at least six dimensions need to be taken into consideration in 
addressing the role of entrepreneurs in post-conflict situations, namely: the context of 
the war; the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship; the role played by 
ethnic/immigrant (minority) entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs in diaspora; the scope of 
the market; human and financial capital requirements; and appropriate forms of 
government support. 
4.2.2 Low quality entrepreneurs 
As has been stressed in this paper, a central theme in the literature on entrepreneurship 
is that entrepreneurial ability/talent or ‘effectiveness’ (θ) matters (see section 3.2.1). 
This ability is however difficult to observe ex ante and as such measures to facilitate the 
entry of entrepreneurs may also encourage entrepreneurs of low ability. 
De Meza and Webb (1987; extended in 1999) show that credit market imperfects may 
lead to ‘overinvestment’, and not underinvestment as in the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
model, when ability (and profits) differs amongst entrepreneurs, and banks cannot 
accurately judge ability. In essence high profit (ability) entrepreneurs subsidize low 
profit (ability) entrepreneurs.28 They argue that a tax on interest rates in such a case 
could improve social welfare. Parker (2003) builds on De Meza and Webb and shows 
that their conclusions are only likely to hold under special conditions. 
Ghatak et al. (2007:2) point out that entrepreneurial ability affects the success of a firm, 
which in turn matters for the probability of the entrepreneur repaying a loan. Because 
banks cannot observe any entrepreneur’s ability ex ante, interest rates on start-up capital 
will reflect average entrepreneurial ability. If the proportion of entrepreneurs of low 
ability increases, it will result in higher borrowing costs, which impose a negative 
externality on entrepreneurs of high ability, who will consequently borrow and invest 
less. 
A second channel through which the entry of entrepreneurs with low ability might 
hinder economic development is through the impact of entrepreneurial ability on the 
productivity of employed workers. Entrepreneurs of low ability will have less 
                                                 
28    The Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model assumes that all entrepreneurs have the same ability (and 
subsequently returns) but are subject to different risks. They show that equity finance is the optimal 
method of finance in such a case. However, if only debt finance is available, as in underdeveloped 
markets, then credit constraints due to adverse selection will apply, and entrepreneurs’ investment will 
be less than optimal. In contrast, in the De Meza and Webb (1987) model entrepreneurs differ in 
ability and will therefore offer different returns. They show that debt finance is the optimal method of 
finance, but that due to asymmetric information about entrepreneurs’ ability, banks would tend to 
provide too much finance, extending finance to entrepreneurs with lesser ability. In essence, high 
ability entrepreneurs cross-subsidize low ability entrepreneurs (De Meza and Webb 1987:281, 292). 
With higher own wealth, this cross-subsidization may still occur if it induces entrepreneurs to take on 
less risky projects (De Meza and Webb 1999:154).   26
productive workers, who will earn lower wages. By reducing wage costs, these 
entrepreneurs in effect lower the opportunity costs of entrepreneurship or self-
employment, and facilitate the entry of more low-ability entrepreneurs (Ghatak et al. 
2007:2). 
4.3 Empirical evidence 
In the preceding sections I described the role of the entrepreneur in various theoretical 
explanations that have been put forward for the structural transformation and growth of 
economies. There is substantial cross-country empirical evidence documenting the 
changing composition of an economy as it modernizes. There is also growing cross-
country empirical evidence on the role of human capital and technological progress on 
economic growth. There is however much less cross-country evidence on the role of 
entrepreneurship in these processes. One reason for this is due to the difficulty of 
measuring entrepreneurship, and the lack of sufficient data, especially on 
entrepreneurship in developing countries (Wong et al. 2005:335; Van Stel et al. 2005: 
318). 
From the best available cross-country data, gathered by the GEM, Wennekers et al. 
(2005), Acs (2006), and Amorós et al. (2007) document and discuss a U-shape 
relationship between self-employment, total entrepreneurial activity (TEA—a measure 
of nascent entrepreneurship), and per capita income. This relationship is depicted in 
Figure 2, using GEM data on TEA from 37 countries in 2002. 
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Figure 2 shows that there exists a U-shape relationship between entrepreneurship (as 
proxied by TEA) and economic development (as proxied by GDP per capita) in 2002.29 
This relationship has also been found to hold for self-employment rates and GDP per 
capita. How can this relationship be reconciled with the role of entrepreneurship in 
structural economic transformation and growth (as discussed in section 4.1)? At low 
levels of development (low per capita income) self-employment is high due to lack of 
sufficient wage-employment. This is the situation that will typically prevail in the 
traditional (Malthusian) society where production would also take place within the 
household (mainly in agriculture) and be aimed at subsistence. It will also prevail where 
larger firms are mainly absent (due to lack of economies of scale) and property rights 
cannot be strongly enforced. In this situation there will be many individuals with high 
entrepreneurial ability, but there will not be many profitable opportunities to exploit that 
would result in economic growth. However, over time population growth and 
technological advances in agriculture and transport would result in growing (urban) 
agglomerations of people, which will result in turn in larger markets, where economies 
of scale can be reaped and where innovation, creativity, and learning can take place (see 
also Goodfriend and McDermott 1995)—hence cities have been described as ‘nurseries’ 
of firms (Duranton and Puga 2001). Entrepreneurs will identify greater opportunities in 
this context, which will result in growing investment and re-allocation of production 
factors from the traditional, subsistence sector, to the modern sector, and economic 
growth will start as depicted in the dual economy models. With entrepreneurs creating 
new and growing firms and as wages start to rise in the more productive modern sector, 
the opportunity costs for self-employment will rise and the ratio of self-employed to 
wage-employed will decline. This corresponds to the downward sloping part of the U-
shaped curve in Figure 1. 
According to Wennekers et al. (2005:295) ‘from a certain level of economic 
development onwards, the employment share of manufacturing starts declining, while 
that of the services sector keeps increasing with per capita income, providing more 
opportunities for business ownership’. This level of development corresponds to the 
transition from the capital-driven stage of growth to the knowledge-driven stage of 
growth (as discussed in section 4.1). It is also accompanied by development of the 
institutional foundation for entrepreneurship, in particular protection for property 
(especially intellectual property).30 Growth in the service sector together with adoption 
of new technologies that lessens the need for economies of scale opens up many new 
opportunities that can be utilized by small firms, and leads to a rise in self-employment, 
corresponding to the upward-sloping portion of the U-shaped curve in Figure 1. These 
types of firms are often ‘high-potential’ firms, implying that self-employment may have 
a more significant impact on economic growth at higher levels of development (Van 
Stel et al. 2005; Wong et al. 2005:345). 
                                                 
29  The U-shaped fitted line was obtained by regressing total entrepreneurial activity against per capita 
GDP and per capita GDP squared. The results were as follows: TEA = 0.187 – 0.00GDP + 2.24GDP
2 
with adjusted R
2 = 0.30 and all the coefficients statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
30  Li and Feng (2005) discuss, with reference to China, how entrepreneurs (‘institutional’ entrepreneurs) 
can drive the adoption of institutional changes that are more conducive to entrepreneurship in general.   28
5 Policy  implications 
Governments and development agencies across the world are devoting substantial 
resources to encourage entrepreneurship. This is especially evident in small business 
and private sector development support programmes promoted by departments of trade 
and industry, and development agencies within the UN and the World Bank,31 to name 
but a few. Therefore, any discussion of the role of entrepreneurship in economic 
development has to contend with the implications from the analytical models and 
empirical evidence for policy. In this section I will pull together some of these from the 
preceding sections. 
Three questions can be asked in the context of a government or development agency’s 
role in attempting to support entrepreneurship: first, whether entrepreneurship should be 
supported? Second, whether entrepreneurship could be supported? And third, if the 
answers to the first two questions are positive, what are the most effective means of 
support? 
5.1  Should entrepreneurship be supported? 
The answer here may depend on the definition of entrepreneurship that the policy maker 
or development agency has in mind. I pointed out earlier that many so-called 
entrepreneurship support programmes are more specifically programmes that support 
small and micro firms, and the self-employed. However, small and micro firms are not 
necessarily synonymous with entrepreneurship: many of these firms do not contribute 
significantly to economic growth and development (Wennekers and Thurik 1999:29). 
Also, many people turn to self-employment out of necessity or out of the desire to evade 
regulations, taxes, and other agents’ predatory activities. It was shown in the previous 
section that as development proceeds, the proportion of people in self-employment will 
decline, as the many necessity entrepreneurs now find more suitable wage employment. 
Self-employment may thus be reflecting productive, unproductive, evasive, and 
destructive forms of entrepreneurship, and may therefore be an unreliable guide as to 
the effectiveness of policies in stimulating productive entrepreneurship, and of 
measuring the impact of entrepreneurship on economic growth. 
Moreover, many small business support programmes may not be supportive of 
entrepreneurship per se. Schramm (2004:105) describes most small business support 
programmes as poverty and livelihood oriented, tending to ‘involve cottage industries 
that add little to the economy in terms of productivity or growth’. Empirical evidence 
that small business development per se will be good for growth is lacking. Beck et al. 
(2003) find no evidence that small business firm growth is associated with higher 
growth levels, and Parker (2006:453) reports that there is an ambiguous empirical 
relationship between the rate of self-employment (often taken as a measure of 
entrepreneurship) and unemployment rates. Audretsch and Thurik (2004:1) point out 
that many small business support programmes are in fact undertaken for social and 
political reasons rather than for economic motivations. 
                                                 
31  The World Bank Group for instance, approved more than US$10 billion in SME support programmes 
over the period 1998-2003 (Beck et al. 2003:1).   29
Not only may such small business support programmes not be effective in supporting 
entrepreneurship, they may even be disadvantageous to entrepreneurship. This possibly 
counter-intuitive conclusion was suggested in section 4 where it was argued that 
increasing the rate of self-employment through, for example, small business policies 
(such as microfinance) could lower the quality of the pool of entrepreneurship in a 
country or region, which could have negative external effects on entrepreneurs of high 
ability. 
Thus, the discussion so far would suggest that the type of entrepreneurship that should 
be supported, should rather be ‘high potential’ entrepreneurship, that is entrepreneurs 
with high ability to be an entrepreneur, where the likelihood of firm growth is higher (it 
was shown that firm size depends among other things on entrepreneurial ability).32 
Indeed,  entrepreneurial ability was emphasized in this paper to be a golden thread 
running through the economic studies of entrepreneurship. The fundamental policy 
implications seem to be that not all persons should allocate their talent towards 
becoming entrepreneurs, but those with high entrepreneurial ability should be assisted to 
become entrepreneurs. Leaving aside (until the next sub-section) the ways in which this 
may be achieved, I can summarize the case for supporting such high-ability 
entrepreneurs. 
The case that governments should support high-ability, high-potential entrepreneurs, 
even via taxes, can be based on the fact that it may have significant externalities: the 
private costs and benefits of entrepreneurship are likely to diverge in many instances 
from social costs and benefits. Thus, I have pointed out in this paper that it has been 
suggested that the private benefits of entrepreneurs’ ‘cost discovery’ or technological 
innovation is much less than social benefits, which reduce the incentives for 
entrepreneurs to provide these ‘services’. Furthermore, the positive relationship between 
the stock of entrepreneurs and the levels and rates of human capital formation in an 
economy, as posited and tested for by Dias and McDermott (2006) implies that policies 
that can increase productive entrepreneurship can also speed up the structural 
transformation of an economy. These positive externalities imply that entrepreneurship 
should be supported through some form of subsidy (see section 5.2). 
However, there may be cases where the social costs of ‘unproductive’ or ‘evasive’ 
entrepreneurship may be higher than the private benefits thereof, and where low ability 
entrepreneurs may crowd out higher ability entrepreneurs. In such cases, some form of 
taxation and/or regulation of entrepreneurial entry may be called for. Strong policy 
implications have emanated from the work of De Meza and Webb (1987; 1999), Coelho 
et al. (2004), and Ghatak et al. (2007) on the effects of low ability entrepreneurs on 
economic development. More radical proposals have included that entrepreneurial entry 
be more heavily regulated and that entrepreneurs be taxed higher (for instance through a 
tax on interest), so as to weed out low ability entrepreneurs. Such taxes have been 
argued to improve both social and the private welfare of entrepreneurs (Kanniainen and 
Poutvaara 2007:677).33 It also implies that provision of subsidized credit/finance to 
                                                 
32  This is also the point of departure of Stam et al. (2007b) who present a case study of entrepreneurship 
policy in the Netherlands, where the objective of entrepreneurship policy is to promote high-growth 
potential firms. 
33    Criticism against the taxation of entrepreneurs, especially in developing countries where self-
employment is often a response against excessive regulation and an absence of strong property rights   30
start-ups may have perverse or neutral effects on economic growth, since this will lower 
the quality of the pool of entrepreneurs, and create an adverse selection problem that 
banks might try to overcome by raising required collateral (Ghatak et al. 2007). Other 
policy proposals have included raising wage rates, as this would be good for both 
workers as well as entrepreneurs, since with higher opportunity costs, the average 
quality of entrepreneurship will increase, which will result in lower borrowing costs and 
encourage high ability entrepreneurs to start-up. Wage rates could for instance be raised 
through an intervention that raises average productivity (Ghatak et al. 2007). 
5.2   Could entrepreneurship be supported? 
There is a strand of literature, associated with the Austrian School, which is of the 
opinion that governments cannot raise the supply or quantity of entrepreneurship, but 
can merely influence the allocation of entrepreneurial ability. In the words of Coyne and 
Leeson (2004:247) ‘government policy cannot create entrepreneurship’. All that 
government should do in this view, is to ‘get the institutions right’, i.e. ensure protection 
of property rights and a well-functioning legal system and maintain macroeconomic and 
political stability and competitive tax rates. 
Not all will agree that government cannot influence the supply of entrepreneurship. 
Arguments in favour of governments’ ability to raise the supply of entrepreneurship 
centre around government’s ability to lower entry costs and regulations, support 
innovative activities (e.g. R&D), and whether or not—and how—government can 
improve entrepreneurial ability in a country. The wide range of entrepreneurship rates 
across countries, even when controlled for variations in institutional quality, would 
suggest that specific policies and regulations—such as start-up costs—may have an 
influence on the supply of entrepreneurs. Figure 3 shows for instance that there is a 
negative relationship in a sample of 37 countries between start-up costs and the start-up 
rate. 
While not indicative of causality between start-up rates and start-up costs, the fact that 
high start-up costs are associated with low start-up rates in developed countries such as 
Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden could suggest that the supply of high-
quality entrepreneurship could be influenced. In fact, a key policy of the European 
Commission to increase the supply of entrepreneurship in the EU is through education 
and programmes to make people aware of the potential of entrepreneurship as an 
occupation. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
(evasive entrepreneurship) is summarized by Kanniainen and Poutvaara (2007) who also point to the 
positive externalities generated by entrepreneurs in developing contexts. Extensions and refinements 
of the models of De Meza and Webb (1987; 1999) by Parker (2003) suggest a less strong possibility 
for ‘over-investment’ to occur.   31
Figure 3: Relationship between start-up costs and start-up rate in GEM sample, 2002
 
Sources of data: World Bank (2003); Van Stel et al. (2005:19). 
 
5.3  What are the best ways of supporting entrepreneurship for economic 
development? 
From the discussion in sections 5.1 and 5.2 a case for the support of high-ability, high-
potential entrepreneurship was made, and it identified that government and international 
development agencies could influence both the quantity (supply) as well as the 
allocation of entrepreneurial talent. I can now draw the conclusions for the types of 
policies that would be consistent with this. 
First, what type of policies could stimulate the supply of entrepreneurship? Here I will 
focus on three types of policies: those aimed at raising the entrepreneurial ability; 
policies aimed at raising the non-pecuniary benefits of entrepreneurship; and policies to 
address the levels of start-up costs and business regulation. 
Entrepreneurial ability is the key to most economic models of entrepreneurship. How 
can entrepreneurial ability be improved? Holmes and Schmitz (1990:266-7) argue that 
entrepreneurial ability can be improved through ‘experience, training, schooling and 
improvements in health’. Of course, as was noted in section 3.22, education (as well as 
better health) can influence both returns from entrepreneurship (as it improves 
entrepreneurial ability) as well as from wages (it makes for more productive workers). 
Therefore, a priori, the effects of education and health investments on their own upon 
entrepreneurship may be ambiguous. Certainly, some evidence suggests that the type of 
knowledge imparted (e.g. more practical, general education) is important, and also 
suggests that in building entrepreneurial capacity tacit knowledge and learning by doing 
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knowledge, and act as trainers or mentors for younger or nascent entrepreneurs, more 
effective strengthening of entrepreneurial ability may occur. In this regard, Kanniainen 
and Poutvaara (2007) have suggested that more successful firms may be sold if the 
incumbent entrepreneur (having demonstrated high entrepreneurial ability) can be 
supported—perhaps even subsidised—to impart some of his/her tacit knowledge of the 
firm and its environment to the new incoming entrepreneur. Entrepreneurial ability can 
also be improved through complimentary support for R&D. As will be argued below, 
imitation may be a better policy in developing countries, and only after macroeconomic 
stability and uncertainty have been addressed in many countries. However, in developed 
countries R&D policies, to stimulate innovation and competitiveness, are seen as key 
policies to support entrepreneurship. It was shown in section 3 that the existence of 
vertical complimentarity between intermediate inputs and final goods production, as 
described in the model of Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996) suggest the case for 
government support of R&D activities and general start-up costs, as these are shown in 
their model to have both pecuniary and technological externalities. 
Entrepreneurs may be also be enticed by improving the non-pecuniary benefits of 
entrepreneurship. This is mainly seen to be accomplished by improving the ‘culture’ of 
entrepreneurship in a society. It may also be important to create a climate in which 
greater investments in entrepreneurial ability may be forthcoming. Thus (as noted in 
section 3.1), a culture that is less critical of inequality, business failure, and personal 
independence may be more conducive to entrepreneurship. This has raised the 
possibility that government’s can foster an ‘entrepreneurial culture’ in society as a way 
to raise productive entrepreneurship. One way for example would be to encourage role 
models of entrepreneurs (Giannetti and Simonov 2004:272). 
There is little evidence however, that governments can decisively change cultural or 
social norms significantly. Various authors have argued that culture tends to be resistant 
to change and is stable over long periods (Licht 2007:850). Licht (2007:856) has also 
argued that because many entrepreneurs are motivated by non-pecuniary gains, policy 
efforts to stimulate entrepreneurial entry by reducing the costs of exit (e.g. through 
making bankruptcy procedures less onerous) may not be effective. 
However, to the extent that these may reduce the stigma attached to failing and 
encourages re-entry into business for habitual entrepreneurs, a positive impact on 
entrepreneurship may result. There may be two justifications for wanting to encourage 
such habitual entrepreneurship. One is that many firms fail due to the poor ability of 
entrepreneurs, but that some entrepreneurs actively learn during this process and thus 
improve their ability, so that they may be more successful a second time around. A 
second justification is that many firms fail due to bad luck, and that too stringent 
bankruptcy laws might prevent entrepreneurs of high ability being able to meet their 
potential (Cressy 2006:114). 
The quantity of entrepreneurship may also be influenced by start-up costs and 
regulations. As was reported in section 3.2.2 and illustrated in section 5.2, there is 
growing empirical evidence that entry costs and regulation may discourage productive 
entrepreneurs from starting up a firm. The policy implication that follows is that entry 
costs and regulations should be reduced. 
From the discussion in this paper, this policy implication could be supported (section 
5.2), but with the caveat that a country’s level of development needs to be taken into   33
consideration, as well as the reasons for the existence of these entry costs and 
regulations in the first place (see section 5.1). For instance, in underdeveloped countries 
with high levels of corruption, the entry barriers may be a source of rents to corrupt 
officials, so that these barriers may not keep out dishonest entrepreneurs and will make 
reform or abolishment of these barriers difficult. Thus in such a situation the removal of 
barriers, if that could be achieved, may have relatively more positive effects in that 
more entrepreneurs of ability could now enter the market, sources of rent-seeking/ 
unproductive activities could be eliminated, and competition levels improve. Once these 
gains have been made—and governance has been improved—some limited form of 
regulation may be re-imposed so as to protect the public from dishonest entrepreneurs. 
The second broad strand of policy measures aims to change the allocation of high-
ability entrepreneurs away from unproductive, destructive, or evasive forms of 
entrepreneurship towards productive entrepreneurship. In this regard much of the 
current literature suggests that the most important ‘policy’ for improving productive 
entrepreneurship is to get the institutional framework in a country right.34 An 
appropriate institutional framework is one that ensures entrepreneurs can capture the 
profits or rewards of their activities. This requires secure property rights (Wiggens 
1995), the rule of law (Parker 2007), reasonable levels of taxes on profits, currency 
convertibility, contract enforcement and financial stability, as well as the ‘fostering of 
opportunities’ for new entrepreneurs through competition policy (Dutz et al. 2000:742). 
Building appropriate institutions in underdeveloped countries, particularly those that are 
in conflict or emerging from conflict, is notoriously difficult. A number of factors 
complicate institutional design, suggesting that although there may be certain core 
universal requirements, a one-size-fits-all approach to institutional design may be 
inappropriate. For one, institutions are endogenous (Acemoglu et al. 2005) and 
relatively little is known about the co-evolution of institutions, entrepreneurial 
behaviour, and a country’s stages of development (Fogel et al. 2006:572). Two, 
institutional reform itself is an ongoing, dynamic process that needs to be managed with 
care towards its speed and consistency (Estrin et al. 2006). It creates uncertainties that 
can have unwanted outcomes for productive entrepreneurship to emerge, such as the 
entrenchment of former elites and a rise in rent-seeking behaviour (Naudé 2007). Three, 
initial conditions may matter for the dynamics and success of institutional 
strengthening. These include the distribution of income and wealth before the 
commencement of institutional reforms and institutional building. High wealth 
inequalities may be associated with lower start-up rates. It also has to be recognized that 
during civil war, different households will have different means and opportunities to 
maintain or dispose of assets so that their post-conflict ability to start-up businesses will 
differ across the country and between various groups (Addison 2001; Brück 2006). 
Household structure, which in itself may be influenced by the war, will influence the 
subsequent start-up rate not only through the assets that may allocate towards new 
ventures, but also in its attitudes and experiences towards risk-taking and existing 
commitments (Brush and Manolova 2004:39). Hence the call by Naudé (2007) for 
decentralization of entrepreneurial support programmes. This suggests the importance 
                                                 
34  It has been argued that entrepreneurs may themselves bring force to bear for appropriate institutional 
change. Li and Feng (2005:5) call such entrepreneurs ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ defined as 
‘innovative person[s] who starts or expand his [/her] business venture and in the process help destroy 
the prevailing non-market institutions in order for his [/her] business venture to be successful’.    34
of targeting various groups (in particular women) and places in a country so as to have 
the best effect on start-ups. It also suggests that the borders between firms and 
households in fragile states are often blurred and that understanding households better 
may improve understanding of entrepreneurship in these situations. 
Finally, one should recognize that post-conflict transition can go through various stages, 
as it did in the Eastern European countries and former Soviet Union. Estrin et al. 
(2006:697) document three phases, each with its own implications and opportunities for 
entrepreneurship. In the first phase they note that uncertainty will be high, but that many 
opportunities for arbitrage will exist. Policy should aim to reduce uncertainty (e.g. 
through macroeconomic and political stability) and encourage entrepreneurs to be active 
as traders and go-betweens (middlemen). In the second phase, longer-term investment 
will start to take place, as lower uncertainty and government stability give rise to public 
sector investment projects and the latter start to crowd-in private sector investment. The 
efficient implementation of public sector investment projects and the attraction of 
external resources for investment (aid and foreign direct investment) are important 
policy objectives in this phase. The third phase is characterized by the deepening of 
institutions to promote finance, market exchange, and contract enforcement. 
Entrepreneurs in this phase will engage in raising levels of competition, and the growing 
maturity of networks and national innovation systems will encourage technological 
transfers and innovation. Policy objectives during this phase should include the 
promotion of R&D,35 university-based research, networking, and clustering. 
6 Concluding  remarks 
Entrepreneurship is important for economic development. In this paper I have discussed 
the process of entrepreneurship from an economic point of view, and described how this 
process can influence economic development and growth. The focus was on how 
entrepreneurial activity, through the creation of new firms, can benefit economic 
development; (i) over the long-run by triggering a ‘take-off’ from Malthusian 
stagnation, (ii) by stimulating structural economic transformation from a predominantly 
traditional/agricultural economy to a modern/industrial economy, and (iii) generate 
continued productivity increases through innovation-driven growth in advanced 
economies. 
I have shown that in the process of entrepreneurship and its threefold role in economic 
development that entrepreneurial ability, the relative rates of return to being self-
employed, and obstacles such as start-up costs and credit market imperfections will 
determine the quantity and quality of entrepreneurship in a region or country. This 
                                                 
35  Should developing countries spend many resources on R&D? The answer would seem to be that it is not 
vital, especially during the first stages of institutional development. For one, imitation may have higher 
returns initially (Schmitz 1989:724). Two, spending on R&D can crowd-out entrepreneurship with the 
result that there might be new ideas but not enough entrepreneurs to implement them (Michelacci 
2003:256). Three, empirical evidence finds that entrepreneurship is distinct from innovation and will 
contribute more than knowledge capital to economic growth (Audretsch and Keilbach 2004:949). Van 
Praag and Versloot (2007) mention that entrepreneurs and innovators in developing countries are often 
unable to expropriate the benefits of their innovations—the implication being that R&D expenditure may 
be ineffective, or result in registration of patents that are not very useful.   35
leaves open the possibility that not all entrepreneurs will be engaged in activities that 
have positive consequences for economic growth. While all entrepreneurs are motivated 
to seek opportunities for self-advancement, in some cases the private benefits of their 
actions will be outweighed by social costs. In this regard I have argued that (i) perverse 
allocation of entrepreneurial ability to rent-seeking, evasion, and predatory activities 
and (ii) low quality entrepreneurial ability can contribute to economic stagnation and 
even a ‘development trap’. 
This suggests that the policy implications for promoting the type of entrepreneurship 
that will contribute to high economic growth and will have positive externalities will 
need to raise both the quantity as well as the quality of entrepreneurial ability. Country 
experiences and empirical evidence suggests that the quantity of entrepreneurial ability 
can be improved through, for instance, education (the type may be important), culture, 
raising awareness of entrepreneurship as an occupational choice, and through learning 
by doing. 
The  quality of entrepreneurial ability can be improved through incentives that will 
entice those individuals with the highest entrepreneurial ability to become entrepreneurs 
and entice other self-employed back into wage employment. Herein selection 
mechanisms (e.g. entry regulations) and allowing entrepreneurs to ‘specialize’ in 
entrepreneurship (i.e. stimulating habitual entrepreneurship) may be important. I have 
pointed out that these policy implications may in many instances run counter to received 
wisdom and practices, for instance it suggests that not all education may benefit 
entrepreneurship since the opportunity costs for the highly educated in entrepreneurship 
may be higher; it also suggests that entry regulations may fulfill a positive function, and 
that credit subsidies for start-ups may dilute the quality of the entrepreneurial pool with 
adverse spill-over effects on good entrepreneurs. 
It is also important to complement measures aimed at raising the quantity and quality  
of entrepreneurial ability with institutional building to improve the allocation of 
entrepreneurial ability. Thus measures to increase the quantity and quality of 
entrepreneurs when they are uncertain about their rewards from productive 
entrepreneurship may result in increased rent-seeking, or evasion of regulations and tax 
measures. Here, macroeconomic stability, positive economic growth, and ensuring a 
reduction in uncertainty in the economic environment are important. Strengthening 
institutions such as property rights, contract enforcement, the rule of law, and 
reasonable taxation are furthermore basic requirements to limit perverse forms of 
entrepreneurship. 
If these measures are successful in raising the quantity and quality of entrepreneurship 
and in providing incentives for the allocation of entrepreneurial ability towards 
activities that support economic growth, the result in many poor and underdeveloped 
countries would be to see an initial reduction in the rate of entrepreneurship as 
measured by the self-employed or business ownership rate. High ability entrepreneurs 
will create jobs, increase the average size of firms, raise incentives for education and 
migration to urban agglomerations and the modern economy, diversify an economy by 
uncovering its production possibilities, and demonstrate and facilitate the adoption of 
new technology. Ultimately this would result in an economy whose structure is 
dominated by the service sector, populated by high-technology firms and highly 
(appropriately) educated workers. Opportunities for self-employment in high-growth 
potential service/innovation oriented small firms would multiply, and would raise the   36
rate of self-employment. Sustained growth will then depend only on how 
entrepreneurial ability interacts with the availability of opportunities. 
However, not enough is known about the dynamics of institutions in developing 
countries and how they will influence the quantity and quality—and allocation—of 
entrepreneurial ability. This should form an important part of the research agenda on 
entrepreneurship in development. Improving our understanding of the role of 
occupational choices within dual economy models and how these relate to dynamic, 
endogenously driven economic growth could be useful to support further research in 
this regard. 
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